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THE ENGLISH CROWN AS AN AID TO DEMOCRACY.

IT is not many months since an editorial in *The Times* (London) declared democracy to be king in England now; and a writer in the *Edinburgh Review* for July, 1890, says:

Parliament is king; it is the modern embodiment of the power of the nation; internal attempts to deprive it of its strength are aimed against that very sovereignty of the people which it is the boast of our reformers to have established on a truly democratic basis.¹

It is scarcely twenty-five years since Mr. Bagehot's remarkable book on the *English Constitution* was first published, yet the parts of the book which set forth the dangers of a democracy under the English form of government are strangely out of harmony with current political literature. The test which Mr. Bagehot feared the cabinet system would not stand is being applied. The English parties are bidding for the laboring man's vote. For better or for worse England is in the midst of a great democratic experiment.

Professor Bryce has discovered in the extreme caution shown in our constitution-builders traces of the Puritan belief in original sin.² They did not put confidence in man. They sought to hedge him about with a multitude of restrictions. This evidence of a belief in original sin does not, with us, seem to grow less. One of the chief objects of our written constitutions is to prevent the officers of government from doing mischief. There is a tendency to multiply these restrictions rather than to diminish them. We believe in democracy as much as any people, but we have our own way of expressing it. None of us knows exactly what is meant in the tenth amendment where it

¹ Article entitled "House of Commons Foiled," p. 287.

² *The American Commonwealth*, I, 299.

speaks of reserving powers to the people; yet we think that in some way there is a deal of sound philosophy in it. There are many things which we do not intend that either our state or our general government shall do or try to do, and we say so in black and white in our written constitutions. Democracy with us is too sacred a thing to be intrusted to anybody. The English democracy is not thus limited or protected. The democratic theory of the English constitution requires that all power should be centralized in the cabinet and the House of Commons. In so far as the English constitution is really democratic, the power to check the House of Commons is taken away from the House of Lords, from the crown and from the courts. If we in America should abolish our state governments, our written constitutions, our independent executive and our federal Senate, and then centralize in the House of Representatives all the powers of government, we should have a constitution such as the extreme democrat in England looks upon as desirable. The English constitution has not quite attained unto this extreme form of unrestrained democracy, yet it has come very near it.

The English people have never consciously adopted a democratic form of government. The form of democracy which they now have has been generated by many forces, some of which have been operating for ages. It is difficult to see how the English constitution could be reduced to definite legal form and adopted, in the American sense, without at the same time giving rise to a multitude of restrictions upon the officers of the government. Certainly there is no reason to believe that the English people or any other people would have deliberately adopted the unrestrained democracy which they now enjoy. The question naturally arises, how then did they come to have such a government? Without attempting to give a complete answer to this question, important light may be thrown upon it by noticing the contributions to this end which have been made and are now being made by the crown.

It is chiefly owing to the peculiar position of the crown that the English constitution has not been committed to writing; that it has been left as a body of customs and indefinite under-

standings. According to the forms of English law the entire government is built up around the throne. The monarch is the source of law. The Parliament is the king's high court for legislation. The courts of law are his courts. The administrative officers are his ministers. There never was a time when some of these forms of law did not represent as true things which were not true. Yet at all times the position of the crown and the other effective forces in the government have been such that these forms of law have been preserved unchanged. When one law squarely contradicts another law it is exceedingly inconvenient to commit them both to writing. If both are committed to writing, one of them is destroyed, or a manifest absurdity is committed. Yet a form of law may be traversed and nullified by an understanding without inconvenience and without apparent absurdity. A matter-of-fact American is sure to be astonished when he reads *Magna Carta* for the first time. In legal form this instrument expresses the gracious will of the king. It is the king who is represented as preternaturally anxious about the liberties of the people. The king enjoins the appointment of the four-and-twenty barons, and directs them to make war upon him and compel him to obey the charter; and the king is even made to say that in case some of his subjects would not of their own accord join the barons in making war upon him, he would order them to do so. This passage in *Magna Carta* may serve to illustrate the absurdities which would appear in English law if the understandings of the constitution should be reduced to written form and enacted into law. The makers of *Magna Carta* lived long before the more refined method of amending the English constitution had been perfected. The modern way is either to traverse the forms of law by an understanding, or, if the form is made void by actual law which the courts enforce, to take care that an appearance of consistency is secured. I do not intend to hold that the crown has been an active force in securing the unwritten character of the constitution, but simply that the forms of law, the unwritten constitution and the unrestrained democracy are correlated facts.

The relation of the crown to the actual growth of democracy in the present century has become much more close and intimate. When the first great reform was carried, in 1832, it was the king who overcame the resistance of the House of Lords, by giving to the prime minister a written statement that if the Lords refused to pass the bill he would create enough new peers to carry the measure. Aware of this threat, they yielded. This act has been made the basis of a new understanding in the constitution, and has ever since gone far to control the action of Parliament. Under this modern idea, the House of Lords has no right to refuse assent to any measure which the people and the House of Commons unite in demanding. It is now one of the commonplaces of the constitution that if the people wish to abolish the House of Lords they may do so. The method of accomplishing this is made clear by the act of the king in 1832. It is the fact that the hand of the Lords may thus be forced that has made it possible to carry the recent democratic reforms.

Mr. Bagehot names a multitude of high-handed acts of government which the monarch may do without consulting Parliament. The following is the oft-quoted passage :

When the queen abolished purchase in the army by an act of prerogative (after the Lords had rejected the bill for doing so), there was great and general astonishment. But this is nothing to what the queen may by law do without consulting Parliament. Not to mention other things, she could disband the army (by law she cannot engage more than a certain number of men, but she is not obliged to engage any men) ; she could dismiss all the officers, from the general commander-in-chief down ; she could dismiss all the sailors too ; she could sell off all our ships of war and all our naval stores ; she could make a peace by the sacrifice of Cornwall, and begin a war for the conquest of Brittany. She could make every citizen in the United Kingdom, male and female, a peer ; she could pardon all offenders.¹

It is decidedly puzzling to an American to be told that these royal prerogatives exist in an extreme form of democracy, and

¹ *The English Constitution*, p. 32.

still more puzzling to be told that these are important factors in the attainment of democracy. Yet both these propositions are made clear in recent works on the English constitution. Instead of the twenty-four barons of *Magna Carta* to compel the monarch to do right, there is the thoroughly established principle of the constitution that every royal act which can affect the rights of the citizen or the well-being of the nation must bear the name of a minister; it must be advised by a minister, and the minister is held responsible for the act. That ancient legal phrase, "the king can do no wrong," which had its origin with the notion that the king, being the source of law, was above the law, is now made to mean that the king in his own name can do nothing at all. For every wrong done by the executive, a minister may be punished.

Professor Dicey, in his recent book on *The Law of the Constitution*,¹ makes it clear that royal prerogative is now an important democratic force. The principle of ministerial responsibility gives the power of the crown to the ministers. So long as the influence of the monarch enabled him to determine who should be his ministers, royal prerogative did strengthen the crown. During that time in English history in which the influence of the Lords was a determining factor in choosing and dismissing ministers, royal prerogative increased the power of the Lords. Now, since the House of Commons and the voters determine who shall be the ministers, royal prerogative benefits the democracy. Professor Dicey is not obliged to rest his case upon a mere theory. In 1872 there was a growing sense in the nation that the practice of purchasing offices in the army, a practice which had furnished to the titled and wealthy classes a convenient way of providing for their sons, ought to be abolished by law. Mr. Gladstone's government accordingly brought in a bill to abolish the abuse. The House of Lords refused to pass the bill. Mr. Gladstone and his cabinet in this emergency concluded to remove the abuse by a royal order. The other case is the one which I have already described. It is by a threat of the exercise of the royal prerogative in the

making of new peers that the resistance of the House of Lords to the great democratic reforms of the century has been overcome. This theory and practice gives to English democracy a double-barrelled weapon. Under ordinary circumstances it brings down its game through Parliament; but if it fails with this, it can resort to the royal order. Thus in English law the most effective manifestation of unchecked democracy bears the name, royal prerogative.

It is natural that an intelligent democrat should think that this situation is too good to be true; and that there must be some hocus-pocus about it. Or, if it is true, how did the ruling classes in England get caught in such a trap? It is certain that this view of the constitution is of recent origin. When Mr. Bagehot wrote his marvellous book he seemed to have been gifted with a sort of clairvoyant power which enabled him to see all that was true about the constitution and some things which never existed. Yet with all his keenness of perception he does not seem to have discovered the extreme democratic possibilities of the royal prerogative. Mr. Bagehot peopled England with a peculiar sort of laboring men, whose minds were overcome with the majesty of the queen. He saw in the crown enough magic to paralyze the minds of the ignorant masses and thus prevent them from ruining the government by an attempt to govern. "The masses of Englishmen," said he, "are not fit for an elective government."¹ I do not believe that the sort of laboring men which Mr. Bagehot describes ever existed in England in controlling numbers. I was in England during the last half of Queen Victoria's jubilee year, and was unable to find even one well-preserved specimen. But I did find among the educated classes a few excellent examples of that peculiar paralysis of intellect before the majesty of the crown. I can well believe that the power of the crown to impose has been great; yet those who have been imposed upon have been chiefly of the ruling educated class. This has given rise to two erroneous beliefs: (1) That the masses are affected by the crown in a way in which they are not affected; (2) that the real powers of the

¹ *English Constitution*, p. 122.

crown are greater than they are. And these beliefs have had much to do with the mental ease of the ruling classes in view of democratic reforms.

It should be said in passing that logic — pure logic — has had a good deal to do with the attainment of a democratic royal prerogative. Our modern method of studying politics has tended somewhat to discredit the value of logic. Nevertheless it is a respectable political force, and the relation of the crown to the present and prospective democracy of England is not likely to be fully understood without a constant realization of the logic of the position. We may not all agree upon the definition of the word constitution, but we do all agree that one of the chief objects of a constitution is to enable the different governmental agencies to work together harmoniously. All constitutions, written and unwritten, depend for their subsistence in large part upon the state of mind of the people. But a constitution like the English, which is largely made up of mere understandings, is peculiarly subject to the direct action of the mind. In the not distant past the English conceived of their nation as made up of distinct classes, and each of these classes was thought of as having distinct and inalienable rights, powers and duties. Logically, then, it was the end of the constitution to secure to each class its rights, and to effect the harmonious co-operation of all the classes in matters of state. But the present habit of Englishmen is to think of their nation as composed of a consolidated people. Every member is thought of simply as a human being, from the queen on the throne to the meanest member of the "submerged tenth." It is now the end of the constitution to find an agency for the expression of the will of this undivided nation, and to harmonize every government organ with its action. The agency selected is the House of Commons. Harmony is secured by subordinating every other governmental organ to this. This principle carried to its ultimate conclusion would remove the last vestige of undemocratic power from the English constitution.

There is no inconsistency in the contention that partial paralysis of intellect in view of the majesty of the crown

should exist at the same time—and in the same mind, for that matter—with the power of logic, and that both should tend to the same end. Logic may promote error as well as truth. The men still live in England who were educated into the belief that it was the very essence of the constitution to secure to the various classes their separate rights and powers. When a man gets a conviction of that sort, which is in exact accord with his strongest desires, fixed in his head, he is not going to give it up for a trifle. There is reason to believe that the same individual may continue in such a course of reasoning long after he has been forced to assent to another course of reasoning which squarely contradicts it. I believe it is Pope who said, when asked which of two arguments was correct, one for and the other against the Catholic religion, that he was obliged to accept them both; that he was a Catholic or a Protestant according as he read last the Catholic or the Protestant argument. There is reason to believe that many Englishmen are to-day democrats or aristocrats according as they are thrown into an old line of reasoning or into a new one. They are not so much convinced as they are outwitted.

I have not intended to convey the impression that the actual English constitution of to-day is entirely democratic in all its parts. I have nowhere said that the monarch was altogether without power and influence. I did express an opinion that many Englishmen are led through a superstitious reverence to believe that this power and influence are greater than they are in fact. Yet all authorities agree that the personal character of the monarch is a real political factor. There is no question connected with English politics respecting which it is so difficult to get reliable information as the political value of the present power and influence of the Queen. Just how far is the parliamentary programme framed by the cabinet without reference to the views of the Queen? Just how much does the Queen influence the cabinet in the matter of appointments and in the conduct of foreign affairs and in the exercise of other royal prerogatives? To these questions it is not possible to find a satisfactory answer. According to the forms of law it is the Queen alone who does all these things. In respect to some of

them it is pretty well settled that she has practically nothing to do. Yet she does do something ; how much it is not easy to find out.

Mr. Bagehot has left nothing to be desired in respect to a part of this branch of the English constitution. He has analyzed the executive into its two component factors. He has convinced us that he saw clearly the cabinet on the one hand and the monarch on the other, and could, if he would, tell us all about the relations of the two. He gives a good many details of the method of contact between monarch and ministers in former generations when the constitution was something very different from what it is to-day. He says that the elder Pitt used to kneel in the presence of the King, and he makes the dogmatic statement that a man cannot argue well on his knees. He is exceedingly detailed and explicit as to the way in which an ideal king and his ministers would commune with each other under the English constitution as it is to-day. Hear what he says :

The sovereign has under a constitutional monarchy such as ours three rights — the right to be consulted, the right to encourage, the right to warn. And a king of great sense and sagacity would want no others. He would find that his having no others would enable him to use these with singular effect. He would say to his minister : “The responsibility of these measures is upon you. Whatever you think best shall have my full and effective support. *But* you will observe that for this reason and that reason what you do not propose to do is better. I do not oppose, it is my duty not to oppose ; but observe that I *warn*.” Suppose the king to be right, and to have what kings often have, the gift of effective expression, he could not help moving his minister. He might not always turn his course, but he would always trouble his mind.¹

It would be wide of the mark to accept this as Bagehot's teaching of the style of conversation which actually takes place between the ministers and the Queen. He is giving an ideal case such as has not been and, if we accept the general teachings of his book, is not likely to be. As to the actual share of the Queen in government he says :

¹ The English Constitution, p. 143.

A secret prerogative is an anomaly — perhaps the greatest of anomalies. That secrecy is, however, essential to the utility of English royalty as it is now. Above all things our royalty is to be reverenced, and if you begin to poke about it you cannot reverence it. When there is a select committee on the Queen the charm of royalty will be gone. Its mystery is its life. We must not let in daylight upon magic.¹

Thus, after convincing us that he above all others was capable of shedding light upon this important part of the government, he flatly refuses to let his light shine. If he really feared lest the reverence for the Queen should be diminished, then by all means he ought never to have allowed his book to see the light. The book has probably done more to destroy a reverence for royalty than would any quantity of poking about it by select committees on the Queen.

A few facts and incidents may serve to illustrate the actual relation of the Queen to her ministers. Only a few months ago our daily papers announced that the Queen had refused to summon Parliament unless the cabinet would consent to make an additional grant to a member of her family, and that the cabinet had refused to approve the grant. It is likely that there is not a particle of truth in this report, for the relation between crown and cabinet is a confidential one and facts are not likely to be given to the public. Yet for purposes of illustration I may assume that the report is true. We know then that the Queen and the cabinet, or the Queen and the prime minister who consults with her on cabinet matters, have been trying to arrange a parliamentary programme for next session, and that they have disagreed about one of the items. The report assumes that Parliament cannot be summoned unless the Queen, in person, takes some share in the matter. Is it true then that the Queen has in her hands power to exact legislative measures from her ministers upon pain of depriving the nation of its Parliament?

This cannot be, for many reasons. The passage which I have quoted from Mr. Bagehot leaves no doubt as to what a good constitutional queen would do in such case. She would say: "For

¹ *The English Constitution*, p. 127.

such and such reasons my way is better than yours. Yet I do not oppose; it is my duty not to oppose. Whatever you think best shall have my full and effective support."

We will now treat the case upon the supposition that the Queen is obstinate. Again Mr. Bagehot is our best guide. In his essay on Lord Brougham¹ he gives an incident upon the authority of Mr. Roebuck which covers the case in point. It was in the time of William IV. The King obstinately refused to dissolve Parliament when his cabinet advised him to do so. The cabinet without the knowledge of the King gave orders to the great officers of state notifying them that the King required their attendance at a certain hour upon the ceremony of the dissolution of Parliament. The ministers likewise gave the customary orders to the keepers of the crown and the robes to have them in readiness at the proper time and place. As a climax of audacity, they ordered the troops, the King's body-guards, to be in readiness. According to law, it was understood that the troops on such an occasion could only be moved by the personal order of the King. Having made all these preparations, Lord Grey, the prime minister, and Lord Brougham, who was Lord Chancellor, went to the King to get him in readiness for the ceremony. The King objected that the preparations could not be made in the time specified, and they informed him, one by one, of the orders which they had given in the King's name. When the matter of the troops was reached, the King said: "The troops have had no orders and cannot be ready in time." "Pardon me, sir," said the Lord Chancellor, "we know how bold the step is, that, presuming on your great goodness and your anxious desire for the safety of your kingdom and the happiness of your people, we have presumed to take. I have given orders, and the troops are ready." The King started in serious anger, flamed red in the face and burst forth with: "What, my lords, have you dared to act thus? Such a thing was never heard of. You, my Lord Chancellor, ought to know that such an act is high treason, my lord." Brougham replied that he did know that it was high treason. Yet he humbly besought

¹ *The English Constitution*, p. 402.

the King to pardon him, and for the sake of the safety of the kingdom, to accept their advice and attend to the matter of the dissolution of Parliament. The King yielded. The moral of this story is obvious enough. The Queen must give effective support to whatever the cabinet advises. When a monarch is insane or is unable to attend to the duties of the office, the ministers appoint a regent in his place. If it should be found impossible to get along with a particular monarch, the constitutional difficulty might be overcome by a regency. A democratic cabinet may be trusted to name a regent who would do as he was advised to do. It was called treason, sixty years ago, for the ministers to give orders to the King's body-guard without the King's knowledge and in opposition to his known wishes. Lord Hartington in a recent speech called it treason to obstruct the measures of the cabinet in the House of Commons. If democracy is king, if the House of Commons is the chosen agency of the democracy, if legislative and executive power are committed to a cabinet whose life is determined by forces centering in the House of Commons ; then it would be treason for the Queen to obstruct the measures of the cabinet. Whatever may have been true in the past, the Queen is now a subject. She must obey the constitution.

As a subject the Queen has some peculiar privileges and some limitations. It is the peculiar privilege of the Queen to be informed of a part of the plans of the cabinet before these plans are made known to the public ; and being informed, she may warn or she may encourage. The only peculiarity about this privilege is in respect to time. The Queen is informed before other subjects. Every day a portion of time is given in the House of Commons to the questioning of the ministers as to their intentions. By this and other agencies the rest of the nation asserts its right to be informed of the plans of the cabinet. Sometimes the ministers say, in answer to a question, that the exigencies of the public business are such that they deem it unwise to answer at the time the question is asked. The Queen, it is maintained, has a right to be informed even though the business may be delicate. But on the matter of

warning or encouraging, the other subjects are not a whit behind the Queen in their privileges and duties. There is a front opposition bench in the House of Commons, occupied by the shrewdest statesmen in the United Kingdom, whose chief occupation it is to warn and discourage the Queen's ministers. Many times it has happened that a cabinet that has not yielded to the warnings of the Queen, that has successfully resisted the opposition in the House of Commons, has yet been induced to yield to the wishes of voters expressed in a mass meeting in Hyde Park. All classes in and out of Parliament exercise the right to warn the ministers.

The constitutional right of the Queen to be informed of the intentions of the ministers is made to rest largely upon the case of Lord Palmerston, who, in 1852, persisted in making important communications to the French government without the knowledge of the Queen and of the other members of the cabinet, and for this offence was publicly reprimanded and removed from the office of secretary of state. It should be observed that in this case Lord Palmerston was acting contrary to the requirements of the prime minister, as well as in disregard of the privileges of the Queen. If a case should occur in which it was thought best by an entire cabinet to do a thing without the knowledge of the Queen, and if a contest should be made over this point and the cabinet should be sustained by the voice of the nation as expressed through the House of Commons, then a new clause, or a new understanding, would be added to the constitution; the right of the Queen to be informed would then be destroyed. In the absence of any contest of this sort, it is assumed that the Queen has a right to know anything she wants to know about the plans of the cabinet. Yet, in the very nature of the case, it must be that she is really informed of only a small part of the business of the ministers. It is probably true that they make a judicious selection of the particular things which the Queen shall know. The matters laid before the Queen for her consideration are undoubtedly the more important matters of state. It is understood that the Queen is to be especially consulted on matters of foreign policy.

Another peculiar privilege of the Queen is exemption from hostile criticism. As the constitution fixes the responsibility upon the ministers, it is understood that the ministers alone are to be criticised for official acts. This is now a part of the constitution ; yet it rests upon a shadowy foundation. Since the democracy of England has begun to attain self-consciousness, its special antipathy has been the House of Lords. While this antipathy lasts it is not strange that the crown should be measurably exempt from hostile criticism ; especially when we remember how effective have been the royal orders against the power of the Lords. But when this special antipathy shall have been removed, the constitution is sure to suffer a change in regard to the exemption of the crown from criticism, and one of two things will happen. Either the monarch will cease to exert a perceptible influence over the policy of the cabinet, or the personal acts of the monarch will be subject to criticism as are those of any other public official. The same principle which has removed from the monarch all effective power tends to remove from the office every vestige of secret influence. In a successful democracy, a secret society can never have a fair chance as a political factor. It is sure to be suspected of worse intentions than it has. The secret influence of the monarch will not escape the operation of this principle.

No one who has had his eyes open to recent events in English politics will accuse me of prophesying without a sign. Has not the Queen been blamed because she was suspected of being more loyal to Lord Beaconsfield's and Lord Salisbury's governments than to Mr. Gladstone's ? Have the objections to grants to the royal household grown more dove-like in tone, or do they constantly become more lion-like ? Does it require a great effort of the imagination to see that, if the conscious dependence of the democracy upon the crown as a weapon against the House of Lords were removed, a condition would soon be reached where the fact that the monarch was suspected of favoring a certain policy or a certain party would be a positive force in the opposite direction ? In that case a prime minister would have to rid himself of all suspicion of royal influence.

Incident to the few privileges peculiar to the monarch there are a number of peculiar limitations. If the monarch is not to be publicly criticised, then it is a violation of the constitution for the monarch publicly to criticise any other official. When some expressions found their way into the public press which had the appearance of a reflection by the Queen upon the Egyptian policy of Mr. Gladstone's government, there was a pretty general feeling that a blunder had been committed. The constitution does not permit the Queen to criticise her ministers publicly. Again, the Queen is deprived of some of the liberties of an ordinary subject in the matter of private correspondence. She cannot write to her children as freely as do other parents. If the constitution requires the cabinet to inform the Queen, in advance, of their intended policy, it likewise requires her to keep the secrets of the cabinet. Several times complaint has been made that the Queen's private correspondence has served to complicate the diplomatic policy of the cabinet.

From what has been said it is evident that the forces are already well advanced which will remove from the office of the crown everything that is undemocratic in its nature. What then will remain? There may still remain the forms of law which will make it inconvenient or impossible to commit the constitution to writing. There may still remain the requirement that the monarch shall go through the form of appointing the ministers. The cabinet may still be required to present in a formal manner to the monarch important parts of their programme before submitting them to Parliament. Not one of these acts has in itself anything about it which is necessarily undemocratic, and each of them may have an important bearing on the maintenance and the success of the extreme English type of unchecked democracy. The cabinet might be required to get its programme in order and, before presenting it to Parliament, to read it over in a clear, distinct voice in front of the statue of the Duke of Wellington. This might be called queer, but no one has any right to say that it would be undemocratic. The presentation of the programme to the monarch could never appear

so queer. Good reasons may be given why an instructed democracy may wish to prolong this ceremony.

It is of the very essence of this extreme type of democracy that the cabinet continue to possess supreme legislative and executive power. It is difficult to see how this could be if the constitution should be reduced to writing. By means of the unwritten constitution the forms of law which attribute all power to the monarch are reduced to a baseless shadow when applied to the king, yet the constitution has transmuted these forms into substance when applied to the cabinet. Will some one explain how such a pass could have been reached if the constitution had been written and formal? If an election should occur in England to-morrow, everybody would understand that the democracy of England would decide whether they were to have Lord Salisbury and a group of men whom he would select, to exercise supreme power; or Mr. Gladstone and a group of men whom he would select. The Queen would appoint whomever the democracy should indicate as their choice. If the Queen did not go through this form of appointment, then some other legal form would have to be invented and adopted. I should like to have some one explain how a substitute for the Queen's act could be inaugurated, which would not at the same time tend to divide and weaken the power of the cabinet.

What then is the democracy of England likely to do with the office of the crown? I admit that I here enter a field of pure prophecy where the signs are not numerous. He who looks to the ignorance of the laboring man in England to prolong the existence of the crown leans upon a broken reed. Yet it seems to me not at all unlikely that an educated and instructed democracy may seek to perpetuate the crown in order that it may prolong the existence of the most effective democratic agency the world has yet seen on a large scale.

I shall mention only one sign. For several years Lord Salisbury has been trying to throw a bait to the English democracy by dropping the suggestion, by the way, that a reformed House of Lords would have greater power than the present House, and thus the House of Commons would be weakened. Some of the

extreme democrats are manifesting a tendency to act upon Lord Salisbury's suggestion.¹ They do not want a power which shall compete with the House of Commons. True, extreme democrats would abolish the House of Lords; yet, as between letting the House of Lords remain as it is and depending upon forces already in their hands to eliminate from it all that is obstructive, and reforming it and thus creating a more powerful second chamber, a preference is expressed for the House as it is. If there is some tendency to an alliance between conservative and democrat to prolong the existence of the House of Lords, it is conceivable that such an alliance might be effective in the case of the crown.

I have assumed throughout this article, as is assumed in current political literature, that the English cabinet, barring the power and influence of the House of Lords and the crown, is entirely democratic. It is beyond my purpose in this place to show how thoroughly democratic it is, by explaining in detail the relation of the cabinet to the voters and to the House of Commons. It is still further from my purpose to show how effective is the cabinet system of government when compared with our own system of divided powers.

JESSE MACY.

¹ *Reynolds' Newspaper*, November 29, 1891.